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INTRODUCTION

New Jersey and Delaware have clashed over the Delaware River
for more than two centuries. 1 The most recent dispute was over a proposed natural gas unloading wharf on the New Jersey shore. 2 Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in New Jersey v. Delaware II,
Delaware owns the riverbed immediately adjacent to the New Jersey
shore. 3 Since the 1970s, Delaware has been regulating these lands to
5
prevent certain industrial uses.4 However, a 1905 interstate compact
between New Jersey and Delaware gave New Jersey the right to exercise "riparian jurisdiction" over improvements appurtenant to its
shores. 6 Projects which extend from the New Jersey shore into the
Delaware riverbed thus need approval from both New Jersey and Delaware. 7 This concurrent jurisdiction led to the recent controversy:
New Jersey wanted to allow the disputed natural gas unloading facility so that it might gain associated jobs and tax revenues; Delaware
sought to prevent construction due to the industrial nature of the
wharf.
Delaware refused to issue a permit for the proposed project, 8 and
the dispute quickly escalated. New Jersey threatened to withdraw
state pension funds from Delaware banks; Delaware countered,
threatening to utilize the National Guard to protect its riverbed territory. 9 The climax of hysteria was reached when a New Jersey legislator inquired into re-commissioning a World War II battleship, the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See New Jersey v. Delaware II, 291 U.S. 361, 376-77 (1934).
New Jersey v. Delaware III, 128 S. Ct. 1410, 1415-16 (2008).
New Jersey 11, 291 U.S. at 385.
New Jersey IIl, 128 S. Ct. at 1425.
Interstate compacts are "[v]oluntary agreements between states enacted into law
in the participating states upon federal congressional approval." BLAcI's LAW
DICTIONARY 298 (8th ed. 2004). The Compact Clause of the Constitution prohibits
states from entering into interstate compacts without such congressional approval. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Historically, interstate compacts have been
useful alternatives to litigation for purposes of resolving interstate boundary disputes. See generally CAROLINE N. BROWN ET AL., THE EVOLVING USE AND THE
CHANGING

6.
7.
8.
9.

ROLE OF INTERSTATE

COMPACTS: A

PRACTITIONER'S

GUIDE XVi-XVii

(2006).
New Jersey III, 128 S. Ct. at 1415.
Id. at 1417.
Id. at 1418.
Report of the Special Master at 21, New Jersey v. Delaware III, 128 S. Ct. 1410
(2008) (No. 134).
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U.S.S. New Jersey.1o The ship, currently a museum piece on the
Camden waterfront,"X would apparently have been used to repel an
2
armed invasion of the New Jersey shore.'
New Jersey eventually sought legal remedy, and the state filed a
3
complaint against Delaware in the United States Supreme Court.1
New Jersey claimed that it had the exclusive authority over improvements appurtenant to its shores, and sought to enjoin Delaware from
exercising police power over such improvements. 14 Delaware claimed
that as sovereign over the riverbed, it retained police power over New
Jersey improvements which extended beyond New Jersey territory.15
The Court assigned the case to a Special Master.16 The Special
Master determined that the 1905 compact granted New Jersey the
right to extend improvements into Delaware territory, but that Delaware retained its police power to exclude such improvements. 17 The
Court upheld the recommendations of the Special Master, but also
held that Delaware only had the authority to exclude from the
riverbed New Jersey improvements which exhibited "extraordinary
character."18 However, this novel "extraordinary character" test
seems to have appeared in the Court's analysis without previous
instance.
In Part II, this Note outlines the common law riparian rights that
form the background of the controversy in New Jersey v. Delaware III
and compares the facts and holding of the present case with the similar case of Virginia v. Maryland.19 Part III reconciles the recommendations made by the Special Master in each case and shows that these
suggestions, though well-reasoned, nevertheless did not resolve the issue at the heart of New Jersey v. Delaware III. Finally, this Note examines the shortcomings of the Court's extraordinary character test
and proposes a reasonableness test in its stead.
10. Id.
11. The U.S.S. New Jersey is available for your next wedding, graduation or other
special event. Further information available at http://www.battleshipnewjersey.
org.
12. See Report of the Special Master, supra note 9 (citing New Jersey's Motion to
Reopen and for a Supplemental Decree at 16-17 apps. 32-33, 41 (2005) (No.11);
Press Release, New Jersey Assemblyman John Burzichelli (Jan. 20, 2006), http:/!
politics.nexcess.net/pressrelease/2006/0 i/assemblymanjohnburzichelli_2.html).
13. New Jersey III, 128 S. Ct. at 1419.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1416.
16. Id. Special Masters are specially appointed judicial officers (usually attorneys)
who serve at the pleasure of the court; the Special Master's decisions report is
generally reviewed by the appointing court, or a party may file exceptions to the
report for further judicial review. See, e.g., BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 1118 (8th
ed. 2004).
17. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 31-32.
18. New Jersey III, 128 S. Ct. at 1427.
19. 540 U.S. 56 (2003).
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

Common Law Riparian Rights

Under common law, riparian land owners enjoy a unique bundle of
property rights associated with the ownership of waterfront real property. 20 These rights typically include the right to withdraw reasonable amounts of water for the beneficial use of the riparian parcel; the
right to use the entire body of water for activities such as sailing,
swimming, and fishing; and the right to wharf out to reach navigable
water. 2 ' The "right to wharf out" is the right of a riparian land owner
to use subaqueous lands to establish a wharf to facilitate the docking,
loading and unloading of vessels. 2 2 The riparian landowner has the
common law right to wharf out to access navigable water even though
the subaqueous lands used for the stabilization of the wharf are owned
by the state. 23 However, the right to wharf out utilizing state land is
by no means absolute; it is limited both by common law and statutory
regulation. For example, a wharf cannot interfere with the public's
right of navigation on the water body, and is also subject to applicable
environmental regulations. 2 4 A state may generally subject wharves
to exercises of police power. 2 5 As the Supreme Court once stated, a
riparian landowner "has the right of access to the navigable part of the
stream in front of his land, and to construct.., a wharf or pier projecting into the stream ... subject to such general rules and regulations
26
as the legislature may prescribe for the protection of the public."
In the usual situation, the state that regulates a particular landowner's riparian rights is also the state which exercises police power
over the owner's wharf.27 It is thus not ordinarily necessary to differ20. "Riparian land" refers to land that is immediately adjacent to, and in contact
with, a body of water, including a lake, river, sea or ocean. See 1 HENRY PHILIP
FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 278-81 (1904).
21. Id. at 279. "Navigable" refers to a body of water that is "[clapable of allowing
vessels... to pass, and [is] thereby usable for travel or commerce." BLACK's LAW

22.
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.

DICTIONARY 1056 (8th ed. 2004). The Commerce Clause of the Constitution gives
Congress jurisdiction over the navigable waters of the Unites States. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See DAN A. TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3:74 (Marie-Joy
Paredes & John J. Sullivan eds., Rel. 20, 7/2008).
See, e.g. New Jersey v. Delaware II, 291 U.S. 361, 375 (1934) ("[Rliparian proprietors have very commonly enjoyed the privilege of gaining access to a stream by
building wharves ... though the title to the foreshore or the bed may have been
vested in the state.").
TARLOCK, supra note 22, at 3-133.
Id.
Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1873).
See Motion of the State of New Jersey to Strike the Expert Testimony of Joseph
Sax and to Strike the Legal Conclusions in the Expert Report of Carol Hoffecker,
or, in the alternative, to Disregard the Same as Evidence at 6, New Jersey v.
Delaware III, 128 S. Ct. 1410 (2008) (No. 134).
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entiate between a state's exercise of riparian authority and its exercise of police power jurisdiction; as both types of jurisdiction are
normally exercised by the same sovereign, courts need not determine
which controls. 28 However, this was precisely the issue in New Jersey
111.29 Delaware claimed that it could exercise its police power to prevent the construction of a wharf which would extend into its sovereign
territory. 3 0 New Jersey claimed that a prior compact between the two
states which granted it "riparian jurisdiction of every kind and nature" gave New Jersey exclusive jurisdiction over riparian improve31
ments appurtenant to its shores, free from Delaware regulation.
Because an analogous conflict to New Jersey III was recently resolved
by the Supreme Court in Virginia v.Maryland,3 2 examination of that
case is warranted.
B.

The Clash Over the Potomac River: Virginia v. Maryland

Virginia and Maryland have disputed the boundary of the Potomac
River since the 1600s; conflicting royal charters led both states to assert sovereignty over the river. 3 3 Jurisdictional disputes inevitably
arose, and the states eventually entered into a compact in 1785 to settle these jurisdictional questions.34 Article Seventh of the 1785 compact provided:
The citizens of each state respectively shall have full property in the shores of
the Potowmack river adjoining their lands, with all emoluments and advantages thereunto belonging, and the privilege of making and carrying out
wharves and other improvements, so as not to obstruct or injure the naviga35
tion of the river.

The 1785 compact addressed fishing rights and criminal jurisdictional issues, but did not resolve the boundary dispute.3 6 The states
eventually agreed to binding arbitration to determine their interstate
boundary along the Potomac. 3 7 It was determined that Maryland
owned the subaqueous soil of the Potomac to the low-water mark on
the Virginia shore.38 However, the arbiters also recognized in Article
Fourth of their award:
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
128 S. Ct. 1410 (2008).
Id. at 1419.
Id.
540 U.S. 56 (2003).
See id., 540 U.S. 56, 60 (2003) (stating that Virginia traces its title to the Potomac
from a charter from King James I, while Maryland asserts that its title to the
river, granted by King Charles I, is superior.).
Id. at 61.
Id. at 62 (citing VA. CODE ANN. Compacts App., pp 342-343 (2001)).
New Jersey v, Delaware II, 291 U.S. 361, 377-78 (1934).
Virginia, 540 U.S. at 62.
Id.
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Virginia is entitled not only to full dominion over the soil to the low-water
mark on the south shore of the Potomac, but has a right to such use of the
river beyond the line of low-water mark as may be necessary to the full enjoyment of her riparian ownership, without impeding the navigation or otherwise
interfering with the proper use of it by Maryland, agreeable to the compact of
[17851.39

Though Virginia had been given the right to use the Potomac beyond the low-water mark, Maryland enacted legislation in 1933 which
required Virginia to obtain Maryland permits for the construction of
water intake structures extending into the Potomac.4O Virginia applied for and was granted such permits between 1957 and 1996.41 In
1996, Virginia applied for a Maryland permit to extend a pipe 725 feet
past the low-water mark on the Virginian shore to obtain improved
water for the residents of Fairfax County.42 Maryland denied the permit, stating that the water intake project would harm Maryland by
facilitating urban sprawl in Virginia.43 Virginia filed several appeals
44
before filing an original action in the United States Supreme Court.
Virginia argued that both the 1785 compact and the arbitration award
precluded Maryland from requiring Virginia to obtain permits for the
construction of water intake improvements along the shores of the Potomac. 4 5 Maryland countered that as sovereign of the river, it had the
authority to regulate the exercise of Virginia's riparian rights, and
that Virginia's long acquiescence in the permit system prevented it
from later asserting riparian sovereignty.46 The question before the
court was thus: Does the 1785 compact and later arbitration award
allow Virginia to construct riparian improvements along the Potomac
free from regulation by Maryland, or does Maryland have the right to
permit and exclude riparian improvements under its police power as
sovereign over the subaqueous soil of the river?
The matter was assigned to a Special Master for determination. 4 7
The Special Master found that the unique language of the 1785 compact and later arbitration clause gave Virginia and its citizens the
right to construct riparian improvements extending beyond the lowwater mark without the consent of Maryland.48 Maryland filed excep39. Id. at 62-63 (citing the Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 196, 20 Stat. 482) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id. at 63.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 63-64.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 64.
at
at
at
at

64-65.
65.
60.
65.
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tions to the Special Master's report; the Supreme Court upheld the
report in a 7-2 decision.4 9
1.

The Court's Determination

The Court began its analysis of the language of the 1785 compact
by stating that it "interpret[s] a congressionally approved interstate
compact just as if we were addressing a federal statute."50 The Court
found that the plain language of the 1785 compact, which granted the
citizens of each state "full property rights" in the Potomac and the
privilege of building "improvements" gave Virginia citizens the right
to construct riparian structures free from Maryland regulation. 5 1 The
Court noted that Article Seventh of the compact did not grant sovereign authority to regulate these riparian improvements, and thus,
"each state was left to regulate the activities of her own citizens." 52
The Court further stated that Article Seventh "simply guaranteed
that the citizens of each State would retain the right to build wharves
and improvements regardless of which State ultimately was determined to be sovereign over the River." 53 The Court found that the
arbitration award gave Virginia, not just her citizens, the right to use
the Potomac beyond the low-water mark. 54 The Court found that the
arbitration award granting the subaqueous soil to Maryland did not
give Maryland the authority to exclude Virginians from the Potomac
through the exercise of its police power.55 The right to construct
structures appurtenant to Virginia's shores was therefore "necessary
to the full enjoyment of her riparian ownership of the soil to [the] lowwater mark[ ]" within the meaning of the language of Article Fourth of
the arbitration award.5 6 The Court thus found that Virginia had the
right, qua sovereign, to the use of the Potomac beyond the low-water
mark, immune from Maryland regulatory authority. 57 The only limitations placed on Virginia's riparian rights were not to impede Maryland's proper use of the river, and not to impede navigation upon the
river.58 The Court quickly disposed of Maryland's acquiescence argu49. Id. at 65.
50. Id. at 66 (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 811 (1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
51. Id. at 66.
52. Id. at 67.
53. Id. at 69.
54. Id. at 70.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 74. The majority states that Virginia's rights are subject to, inter alia, the
federal navigation servitude. Id. Justice Kennedy's dissent disagrees, stating
that because the Potomac is owned entirely by Maryland, federal common law
does not apply. Id. at 90 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Though the federal navigation question is beyond the scope of this Note, Kennedy's assertions are false;
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ment, stating that Maryland did not establish that a substantial period of time elapsed between her 1957 permitting of the first of
Virginia's water intake projects and the 1996 dispute.59 The Court
also noted that Virginia had "vigorously protested" Maryland's permitting system in 1976.60 The Court held that Virginia and its citizens may construct riparian improvements and withdraw water from
the Potomac without regulation from Maryland. 6 1 Aided by a twocentury-old compact and Article Fourth of the arbitration award, Virginia's riparian rights trumped Maryland's police power to regulate
improvements over its subaqueous territory.
2. Justice Kennedy's Dissent Suggests the Adoption of a
Reasonableness Test
Justice Stevens' dissent noted that under Virginia law, the intake
of water for domestic use by the inhabitants of Fairfax County was not
the exercise of a "riparian right";62 therefore, Virginia had no authority to withdraw water without the consent of Maryland. 63 Stevens
found that even if such a withdrawal of water was an exercise of riparian rights, "all riparian rights at common law [are] subject to the par64
amount regulatory authority of the sovereign that owns the river."
Justice Kennedy's dissent found the 1785 compact to be a "hedging
agreement" that established permanent assurances of riparian rights
at a time when ownership of the Potomac was in dispute.6 5 Once the
boundary dispute was resolved, the riparian rights vested in Virginia
by the 1785 compact became subject to Maryland's sovereign powers. 66 Kennedy's dissent also found that the language of the arbitration award, which stated that Virginia had "full dominion" to the lowwater mark, was unlimited, while the language that followed-"right
to such use of the river beyond the line of low-water mark as may be
necessary to the full enjoyment of her riparian ownership"-was limited by Maryland's reasonable use of its sovereign police power over
said rights. 6 7 Though Maryland could not exclude Virginia or its riparian landowners from the river, Kennedy would hold that the state

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Maryland's ownership of the Potomac does not change the Potomac's status as an
interstate river. See TARLOCK, supra note 22, at § 10:4 note 2.1.
Virginia, 540 U.S. at 76-77.
Id.
Id. at 79 (decree of the court).
Id. at 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Purceville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 521
(1942)).
Id. at 81-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Purceville, 179 Va. at 521).
Id. at 82.
Id. at 85 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 85-87 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 87-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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would be able to reasonably regulate the riparian rights vested in Vir68
ginia and its citizens.
B.

The Clash Over the Delaware River: New Jersey v.
Delaware
1.

The 1905 Compact

One early dispute between New Jersey and Delaware concerned
the boundary of the Delaware River within a circle of twelve miles
around the town of New Castle, Delaware. 6 9 Delaware claimed that it
had superior title to the subaqueous soils all the way to the low-water
mark70 on the New Jersey side of the river within the twelve-mile circle, tracing its title to a 1682 deed of feoffment from the Duke of York
to William Penn. However, New Jersey claimed that the Duke of York
did not own all of the subaqueous land contained in the grant, and
therefore Delaware's title to the subaqueous land on New Jersey's side
7
of the river was invalid. 1
Delaware remained convinced of its superior title, and in 1871 enacted a law which required out-of-state residents to purchase Delaware fishing licenses to fish the Delaware River. 72 New Jerseyans in
73
violation of the new law were later arrested by Delaware officials.
New Jersey claimed that Delaware had no right to arrest New Jersey
citizens past the thalweg of the Delaware River. 74 After negotiations
between the two states failed, New Jersey sought resolution of the
boundary dispute in 1877 by filing an original complaint with the
United States Supreme Court.75 The Court issued a preliminary injunction, ordering Delaware to suspend its 1871 license provision for
out-of-state fishermen until the pending suit was resolved.76 The
states continued to negotiate, but could not agree to a final resolution
regarding the location of the interstate boundary on the Delaware
77
River.
However, the states did reach agreement as to their respective
fishing rights on the river, as well as to the right to serve criminal and
68. Id. at 86-87 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69. New Jersey v. Delaware II, 291 U.S. 361, 363 (1934).
70. The "low-water mark" is "the point to which the water recedes at its lowest
stage." BLAcies LAw DICTIONARY 1623 (8th ed. 2004).
71. New Jersey 11, 291 U.S. at 365, 373.
72. 14 Del. Laws 84 (1871).
73. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at C6.
74. Id. at C-6 to -7. The thalweg is "[tihe middle of the primary navigable channel of
a waterway, [usually] constituting the boundary between states." BLAci's LAw
DICTIONARY 1516 (8th ed. 2004).
75. This dispute became New Jersey v. Delaware (New Jersey I), No. 1 Original
(1877), withdrawn, 205 U.S. 550 (1907).
76. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at C-7.
77. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at C-9 to -10.
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civil processes to persons within the twelve-mile circle.78 This agreement was embodied in the compact of 1905, which was ratified by Congress in 1907.79 Pursuant to the compact, New Jersey withdrew its
1877 complaint still pending in the Supreme Court.SO Two articles of
the 1905 compact would sow the seeds for later controversy in New
Jersey III, as discussed below: Article VII states, "Each State may, on
its own side of the river, continue to exercise riparian jurisdiction of
every kind and nature, and to make grants, leases, and conveyances of
riparian lands and rights under the laws of the respective States."8 1
Article VIII states, "Nothing herein contained shall affect the territorial limits, rights, or jurisdiction of either State of, in, or over the Delaware River, or the ownership of the subaqueous soil thereof, except as
herein expressly set forth."82
2. Resolution of Delaware's Title
Tensions between New Jersey and Delaware would develop again
in 1925, when boats from Delaware harvested oysters from subaqueous lands south of the twelve-mile circle, lands that were claimed by
New Jersey.8 3 In 1929, New Jersey filed a second original complaint
against Delaware in the United States Supreme Court to determine
the states' boundary line on the Delaware River.8 4 This resulted in
the second original Supreme Court action between the two states in
New Jersey 11.85 The Court concluded that Delaware's title from Penn
was valid. Delaware was thus determined to own the subaqueous soil
of the Delaware River to the low-water mark on the New Jersey shore
within the twelve-mile circle. 8 6 However, the Court found that south
of the circle, New Jersey owned the subaqueous soil to the thalweg of
the Delaware River.8 7 The Court's ruling created an anomalous situation: Delaware owned the subaqueous soil in the twelve-mile circle up
to the low-water mark on the New Jersey shore, but the 1905 compact
was still in effect,88 thus giving New Jersey the right to exercise "riparian jurisdiction of every kind and nature" appurtenant to its
78. This is embodied in the Act of Jan. 24, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-32, 34 Stat. 858.

79. Id. at 861.
80. Id. at 860.
81. Id.
82. Id.

83. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 14.
84. Id.

85. Id. See also New Jersey v. Delaware II, 291 U.S. 361 (1934) (Supreme Court's
opinion in New Jersey II).
86. New Jersey 11, 291 U.S. at 374-75, 378.
87. Id. at 385.

88. Id. (stating that though Delaware was determined to own the soil up to the lowwater mark on the New Jersey side of the Delaware River within the twelve-mile
circle, this was "subject to the Compact of 1905").
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shores.8 9 This provided the framework for the third original action in
the Supreme Court between New Jersey and Delaware. 90
3.

Renewed Tensions

In 1971, Delaware began to regulate industrial development
within its coastal waters, enacting the Delaware Coastal Zone Act
("DCZA").91 Delaware sought to "protect the natural environment of
its bay and coastal areas [to] safeguard their use primarily for recreation and tourism."92 The Delaware legislature determined that the
state would prohibit "new heavy industry" and "bulk product transfer
facilities" in its coastal waters in order to effectuate its coastal public
policy. 93 The DCZA therefore requires that new projects extending
past the low-water mark of the New Jersey shore within the twelvemile circle must be approved and permitted by the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control ("DNREC").94
95
Because New Jersey also has regulations for coastal development,
projects which straddle the interstate boundary and extend from New
Jersey territory past the low-water mark on the New Jersey shore
within the twelve-mile circle need both New Jersey and Delaware approval. This unusual concurrent jurisdiction eventually led to renewed conflict between the two states.
In September 2004, Crown Landing LLC, a subsidiary of British
Petroleum ("BP"), applied to DNREC for approval to drill test borings
related to a liquefied natural gas terminal that would extend past the
low-water mark on the New Jersey side of the Delaware River within
the twelve-mile circle. 9 6 Crown Landing also applied in January 2005
for a waterfront development permit from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP").97 The test borings
were the first step in the construction of a proposed liquefied natural
gas ("LNG") unloading terminal.98 The proposed wharf would extend
2,000 feet into Delaware territory, consist of a 6,000-sqaure foot LNG
unloading facility, and require the dredging of 1.24 million cubic yards
of Delaware's subaqueous soil, ultimately disturbing over 29 acres. 9 9
89. Act of Jan. 24, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-32, 34 Stat. 858, 860.
90. New Jersey v. Delaware II, 128 S. Ct. 1410, 1416, 1419 (2008).
91. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 18; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7,
§§ 7001-7013 (Michie 2004).
92. DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 7, § 7001.
93. Id.
94. Id. §§ 7002, 7004.
95. See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-1 (West 2008).
96. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at C-31 to -32.
97. Id. at C-32.
98. Id. at C-31. The proposed terminal is commonly known as the "Crown Landing
Project." Id.
99. New Jersey v. Delaware III, 128 S. Ct. 1410, 1417-18 (2008).
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BP supertanker vessels with capacities of 200,000 cubic meters would
berth at the terminal.100 These tankers were 40 percent larger than
any vessels of their kind, and would pass densely populated areas,
consequently requiring a safety zone restricting other ships to keep
appropriate minimum distances.l1l The proposed terminal was projected to create more than 1,300 new jobs for New Jersey, and may
have increased New Jersey's gross state product by as much as $277
million, thus potentially earning the state and local governments
more than $13 million in annual tax revenues.1 0 2
DNREC characterized the proposed wharf as both a "heavy industry use" and a "bulk product transfer facility" and accordingly found
that the project would violate the DCZA, which prohibited offshore
bulk product transfer facilities and heavy industry use within Delaware's coastal areas.1 0 3 BP appealed the decision to the Delaware
Coastal Zone Industrial Board ("DCZIB"), which affirmed the
DNREC's findings.104 BP did not appeal the DCZIB decision.1 O5 Instead, New Jersey took up the fight against Delaware, seeking to reopen the Supreme Court's 1934 decision in New Jersey 11.106 But the
Court denied the motion to reopen, instead directing that New
Jersey's petition be treated as a bill of complaint for a new original
action, which would become New Jersey 111.107
4. The Recommendations of the Special Master
The Supreme Court referred the controversy between New Jersey
and Delaware to a Special Master for consideration.10 8 The Master
noted that the resolution of the riparian lands, rights, and jurisdiction
issues in the suit depended upon "the meaning of Article VII of the
[19051 Compact."109 The Master stated that an interpretation of these
Articles must take into account the parties' contemporaneous 1905
understanding of the language therein, as well as the parties' course
of conduct since the adoption of the compact. 1 10
The Master first addressed the issue of whether New Jersey had
the authority to make grants of riparian land on its side of the river
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 1418 & n.7.
Id.
Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1418 & n.11 (majority opinion) (internal brackets omitted).
Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at C-32 to -33.
Id.
Id. at C-33.
Id.
New Jersey I1, 128 S. Ct. at 1424. The Court appointed Ralph Lancaster, Jr. as
Special Master; Mr. Lancaster was also the Court's appointed Special Master in
Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56 (2003). New Jersey III, 128 S. Ct. at 1424.
109. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 32.
110. Id. at 32-33.
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beyond the low-water mark into Delaware subaqueous territory. The
Master stated that a sovereign will not be found to have waived its
rights unless explicitly declared,111 and that there exists a "strong
presumption against defeat of a State's title." 112 The Master noted
that Article VIII of the 1905 compact reinforced these presumptions,
reciting that nothing in the compact "'shall affect the territorial limits,
rights, or jurisdiction of either State of, in, or over the Delaware River,
or the ownership of the subaqueous soil thereof, except as herein expressly set forth.'" 1 13 The Master found that Article VII expressly declared that each state could continue to grant riparian lands on its
own side of the Delaware River, but this provision did not expressly
declare that New Jersey could grant Delaware land. 1 14 New Jersey
could thus only grant lands to which it properly held title, or in other
words, down to the low water mark.11 5 The Master reinforced his pronouncement, stating that it was inconceivable that Delaware would
have implicitly agreed to waive its sole right to grant lands on the
Delaware side of the river via the 1905 compact, which was entered
into at a time when both states disputed the interstate boundary.116
Finally, the Master agreed with Delaware 1 7 that if New Jersey was
given the right by Article VII to grant Delaware's subaqueous lands,
New Jersey would be able to modify the Supreme Court's boundary
determination in New Jersey II anytime it so desired. 1 18 The Master
thought it implausible that the Supreme Court would have labored
over the determination of the interstate boundary in New Jersey II,
11 9
only to permit New Jersey to later alter that boundary at will.
The Master addressed the issue of whether New Jersey had the
authority to makes grants of riparian rights separately from the issue
of grants of riparian lands.12o Article VII provided that each state
would have the authority to grant "riparian rights" appurtenant to its
shores; 1 2 1 the Master noted that the meaning of riparian rights gener111. Id. at 43 (quoting United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700, 707 (1987)).
112. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 42 (quoting United States v.
Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 34 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id. at 43.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 44.
117. See Reply Brief of Delaware in Response to Exceptions by New Jersey to the Report of the Special Master at 16, New Jersey v. Delaware III, 128 S. Ct. 1410
(2008) (No. 134 Original) ("Article VII . . . does not give New Jersey power to
grant lands within Delaware's territory. If it did, New Jersey would be able unilaterally to change the interstate boundary set by this Court in 1935 every time it
made a riparian grant beyond the low-water mark .
118. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 45.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 46.
121. See Act of Jan. 24, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-32, 34 Stat. 858, 860.
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ally includes the right to wharf out, even though the bed of the river
may be vested in the state. 122 Under Article VII, New Jersey retained
the right to grant the riparian right to wharf out beyond the low-water
mark, even though the river bed was later determined to belong to
Delaware.123 However, the right to wharf out was recognized to be
subject to state regulation; the issue was which state or states would
be held to regulate this right.124
The Master found that Article VII's grant of "riparian jurisdiction
of every kind and nature" to each state1 25 was not a grant of exclusive
riparian jurisdiction to New Jersey, but rather vested both states with
overlapping jurisdiction. 126 The Master noted that the term "riparian
jurisdiction" was not a legal term of art in 1905,127 and appeared to be
specially drafted for the compact. 1 28 The Master thus found "riparian
jurisdiction" to be ambiguous, and stated, "When construing ambiguous provisions of an interstate compact, it is appropriate to consider
extrinsic evidence that helps shed light on the drafters' intentions."12 9
The Master found it compelling that the term "riparian jurisdiction"
appeared in the same sentence as "riparian rights" in Article VII. He
assumed that the drafters intended "riparian jurisdiction" to relate to
the governing of "riparian rights." The Master therefore determined
that "each State retained the ability to grant riparian rights and exercise jurisdiction over riparian rights on its own shores, regardless of
where the boundary might later be located."130 The Master noted that
this was consistent with the "continue to exercise riparian jurisdiction" language in Article VII, as "continue" simply referred to the preservation of New Jersey's right to govern the full scope of its riparian
rights-a right it apparently practiced for many years before 1905.131
However, the Master rejected New Jersey's argument 13 2 that the riparian jurisdiction granted in Article VII allowed New Jersey to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over the riparian improvements on its shores,
stating that "riparian" is a limiting modifier, and is not equivalent to
122. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 48 (quoting New Jersey v. Delaware II, 291 U.S. 361, 375 (1934)).
123. See Report of the Special Mater, supra note 9, at 48-49.
124. Id. at 53.
125. Act of Jan. 24, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-32, 34 Stat. at 860.
126. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 53.
127. See id. at 54.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 n.5 (1991)).
130. Id. at 56.
131. Id. at 56-57.
132. See Petition for a Supplemental Decree at 2, New Jersey v. Delaware III, 128
S.Ct. 1410 (2008) (No. 123, Orig.) (stating that the 1905 compact "grants New
Jersey riparian jurisdiction to regulate the construction of improvements appurtenant to the New Jersey shore of the Delaware River within the Twelve-Mile
Circle, free of regulation by Delaware").
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"exclusive."1 3 3 The Master also found compelling Delaware's argument1 3 4 that the word "exclusive" appeared in other Articles of the
1905 compact, but not in Article VII; it was therefore determined to
have been intentionally left out of Article VII. 13 5 The Master cited
precedent that when construing ambiguous compact language, it is
appropriate to "seek guidance from comparable language in other
compacts."136 For these reasons, the Master took notice of an earlier
compact between New Jersey and New York, which had "strikingly
similar language[,]" but which conspicuously contained the word "exclusive" in relation to "riparian rights."13 7 New Jersey was thus
deemed to have been aware that the 1905 compact's grant of "riparian
8
jurisdiction" was not equivalent with "exclusive jurisdiction."'13
The Master determined that when construing the meaning of a
compact, it is entirely appropriate to examine evidence of the parties'
course of action since the formation of such compact. 1 39 He agreed
with Delaware 1 40 that the parties' course of action since 1905 provided credibility to the assertion that New Jersey had acquiesced in
Delaware's regulating authority.141
The Master noted that Delaware had exercised police power to regulate wharves on the New Jersey shore since the enactment of the
DCZA in 1971, and that New Jersey cooperated with this exercise of
police power for several decades.14 2 The Master also found persuasive
Delaware's argument that New Jersey had conceded any claim to exclusive riparian jurisdiction when the NJDEP admitted to the U.S.
Department of Commerce in 1980 that "any New Jersey project extending beyond mean low water must obtain coastal permits from
133. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9 at 57-58.
134. See Brief of the State of Delaware in Opposition to the State of New Jersey's
Motion to Reopen and for a Supplemental Decree at 56, New Jersey v. Delaware
III, 128 S.Ct. 1410 (No. 123, Orig.) (stating that Article IV of the 1905 compact
explicitly granted "exclusive jurisdiction" in relation to the states' common rights
of fishery; therefore, Delaware argued that if the drafters had intended to grant
New Jersey "exclusive" riparian jurisdiction, they would have explicitly stated
"exclusive," rather than granting merely "riparian jurisdiction" ).
135. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9 at 62.
136. Id. at 67-68 (paraphrasing Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 (1991)).
137. Id. at 66.
138. Id. at 66-67.
139. Id. at 68-69 (citing United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989)).
140. See Brief of the State of Delaware in Opposition to the State of New Jersey's
Motion to Reopen and for a Supplemental Decree at 63, New Jersey v. Delaware
III, 128 S.Ct. 1410 (2008) (No. 123, Orig.) (claiming that Delaware had exercised
police power over the lands through the DNREC since the 1970s, without opposition from New Jersey).
141. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9 at 68.
142. Id. at 71-72.
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both states."143 The Master was further compelled by the fact that
New Jersey recently sought approval by the DNREC for the modification of a New Jersey state park pier. 14 4 The Master found that although New Jersey issued many riparian grants beyond the low-water
mark since 1905, Delaware only had recently attempted to regulate its
subaqueous lands.14 5 Since that time, New Jersey, not Delaware, was
the party to acquiesce in the other's exercise of regulatory
authority.146
The Master distinguished Virginia v. Maryland from the present
controversy, and thus rejected New Jersey's assertion that it, like Virginia, should be able to exercise its compact-preserved riparian rights
free from interference from the sovereign owner of the subaqueous
soil.147 The Master determined that although the holding in Virginia
v. Maryland appeared "superficially" to buttress New Jersey's claim,
the unique language of the compact and arbitration award in Virginia
v. Maryland was different from the 1905 compact: Virginia was given
the "right to such use of the river beyond the line of low-water mark as
may be necessary to the full enjoyment of her riparian ownership." 148
The Master concluded that this language was distinctive from the
1905 compact language granting New Jersey "riparian jurisdiction of
every kind and nature[,]" and bolstered this assertion by noting that
during arbitration, Maryland ceded that the boundary line between
the two states should be drawn around "all wharves and other improvements now extending or which may hereafter be extended, by
authority of Virginia from the Virginia shore." 149 The Master stated
that this type of cession was notably absent from the current
controversy. 150
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Master determined that New
Jersey did not have exclusive authority to regulate riparian improvements appurtenant to its shores extending past low-water within the
twelve-mile circle, but was limited to exercising jurisdiction related to
its riparian rights granted by the 1905 compact.151 Delaware, as the
sovereign, retained the right to exercise its police powers over any improvements which extended into its territory. 15 2 New Jersey riparian
improvements were thus subject to both the limited riparian authority
143. Id. at 72-73 (citing New Jersey's Response to Requests for Admissions No. 62
(DA 4177)).
144. Id. at 75-76.
145. Id. at 98.
146. Id. at 90-91.
147. Id. at 64 n.118 (quoting Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 62-63 (2003)).
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting Virginia, 540 U.S. at 72 n.7).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 85-86.
152. Id. at 86.
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of New Jersey, as well as the sovereign police power of Delaware. Delaware could therefore block the building of the Crown Landing Project
under the DCZA as an exercise of its police power.
New Jersey filed exceptions to the Report of the Special Master;15 3
the Supreme Court upheld the Master's determinations "in principal
part."'154 The Court in fact quoted the Special Master extensively, and
sustained all of his findings, adding relatively little new analysis of its
own. 15 5 As the Special Master's analysis has been discussed at
length, only a brief overview of the Court's opinion is warranted.
5.

The Court's Determinations

The Court held that Article VII's grant of riparian jurisdiction did
not confer exclusive jurisdiction to New Jersey, and that Delaware
still retained police power over improvements extending into its sovereign territory.156 The Court stated, "To attribute to 'riparian jurisdiction' the same meaning as 'jurisdiction' unmodified, or equating the
novel term with the distinct formulation 'exclusive jurisdiction,' would
deny operative effect to each word in the Compact, contrary to basic
principles of construction." 5 7 The Court also upheld the Master's examination of the language of the New Jersey-New York compact
(which contained the words "exclusive jurisdiction") as evidence that
New Jersey understood that the New Jersey-Delaware compact's
omission of the word "exclusive" in Article VII was detrimental to its
present claims.158 The Court noted: "Interstate compacts, like treaties, are presumed to be the 'subject of careful consideration before
they are entered into, and are drawn by persons competent to express
their meaning, and to choose apt words in which to embody the purposes of the high contracting parties."1 59
The Court agreed with the Master that Virginia v. Maryland was
distinguishable from the current controversy because of the "unique
language" of the Virginia-Maryland award and later arbitration
award, which were found to differ significantly from the language of
the 1905 compact's provisions which granted "riparian jurisdiction of
every kind and nature."160 The Court found that neither the 1905
compact nor the final boundary settlement in New Jersey II gave New
153. New Jersey v. Delaware III, 128 S. Ct. at 1419. New Jersey did not take exceptions to the Master's rulings on the issues of estoppel, acquiescence, and prescription. Id. at 1419 n.12.
154. Id. at 1416.
155. Compare New Jersey III, 128 S.Ct. at 1419-27 with Report of the Special Master,
supra note 9 at 42-98.
156. New Jersey III, 128 S. Ct. at 1419.
157. Id. at 1420-21 (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539 (1955)).
158. Id. at 1423.
159. Id. (quoting Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 332 (1912)).
160. Id. at 1424 (quoting Report of the Special Master, supra note 9 at 64 n.118).
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Jersey all jurisdictional authority, as did the language of the VirginiaMaryland arbitration award.161 The Court also noted that Virginia
was given sovereign authority over improvements extending into the
Potomac as part of a boundary settlement, which the Court found distinct from the riparian jurisdiction granted to New Jersey in16 1905
2
while the New Jersey-Delaware boundary was still in dispute.
The Court agreed with the Master that the parties' course of conduct since the 1905 compact militated toward a ruling in Delaware's
favor.16 3 The Court found that New Jersey had acquiesced in the
DNREC's regulation of projects extending into Delaware for over
thirty years, that New Jersey failed to take issue with Delaware's
1971 rejection of a similar LNG unloading facility, and that the
NJDEP had conceded that Delaware rightfully exercised its police
power beyond the low-water mark. 164
The Court departed significantly from the Master in one aspect,
announcing: "New Jersey and Delaware have overlapping authority to
regulate riparian structures and operations of extraordinarycharacter
extending outshore of New Jersey's domain into territory over which
Delaware is sovereign." 16 5 This "extraordinary character" language
was missing from the Report of the Special Master, which simply
stated that Delaware retained the right to exercise its police powers
over any improvement which extended into its territory, not just improvements which exhibit extraordinary character. 16 6 In fact, the
only mention of "extraordinary" in the Special Master's Report was in
a footnote which stated that "[e]xtraordinary, unusual modes of use
S.. are not annexed as incidents in law" in reference to the riparian
right to wharf out. 16 7 This was not part of the Master's recommendations,168 but was merely used to buttress the Master's finding that the
common law riparian right to wharf out was limited by navigability
and nuisance considerations. 169 However, the addition of the extraordinary character test to the recommendations of the Master did
not change the outcome of the case; the Court found that the proposed0
Crown Landing Project went "well beyond the ordinary or usual[,]"17
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id. at 1419.
Id. at 1425.
Id. at 1425-26.
Id. at 1416 (emphasis added).
Examine Report of the Special Master, supra note 9 at 100.
Report of the Special Master, supra note 9 at 50 n.98, (quoting Keyport & Middletown Point Steamboat Co. v. Farmers Transp. Co., 18 N.J. Eq. 511, 1866 WL
89, at *5 (1866)).
168. See Report of the Special Master, supra note 9 at 99-100.
169. Id. at 50.
170. New Jersey III, 128 S.Ct. at 1427-28. The Court did not explicitly state what
constituted "extraordinary character," but it implicitly suggested that the length
of the wharf, size of the unloading platform, capacity of the vessels which would
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and thus held that Delaware's rejection of the project was "within the
scope of its governing authority to prohibit unreasonable uses of the
river and soil within the twelve-mile circle."1 7 1 Delaware could thus
only exercise authority over riparian improvements on the New Jersey
shore extending past the low-water mark "to the extent that they exceed ordinary and usual riparian uses."172
Justice Stevens concurred, disagreeing only with the court's extraordinary character test. 17 3 Stevens agreed with the Special Master
that Delaware should be able to exercise its police power over all riparian improvements that extend past the low-water mark.17 4 Stevens
justified this view, stating that New Jersey's riparian rights would be
protected by reasonable limits of Delaware's police power; Delaware
thus could not treat New Jersey riparian improvements differently
than Delaware riparian improvements, "absent some reasonable police-power purpose."175
Justice Scalia dissented, stating that the Court's extraordinary
character test had no basis in prior law.176 Scalia stated that the
Court's decision that New Jersey had overlapping jurisdiction with
Delaware over riparian improvements beyond the low-water water
mark made Article VII of the 1905 compact a "ridiculous nullity." 177
Scalia found that the riparian right of wharfing out was traditionally
used to facilitate the loading and unloading of cargo, even of hazardous cargo. 178 He therefore posited that the Crown Landing Project
would have been "an ordinary and usual riparian use" in 1905, and
thus even if the Court's extraordinary character test were applied to
the facts of this case, Delaware could not hinder New Jersey's exercise
of riparian authority.179 Scalia further objected to the extraordinary
character test, stating: "What in the world does it mean? Would a pink
wharf, or a zigzagged wharf qualify?"' 8 0 Scalia also foresaw the possibility that the Court's rule could spawn further litigation: "we can anticipate a whole category of original actions in this Court that will

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

berth there, amount of dredging that would occur, the fact that Delaware considered the project to be a bulk transfer facility and heavy industry use, and the fact
that hazardous cargo would pass by residential areas were all relevant factors.
Id. at 1417-18.
Id. at 1427-28.
Id. at 1428.
Id. at 1429 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 1428-30 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 1430 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1433 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1433 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1440 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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clarify, wharf by wharf, what is a wharf of 'extraordinary
character.'"181
Scalia found the Court's decision in Virginia v. Maryland to be dispositive in the present controversy.' 8 2 Scalia rejected the Master's
statement that the Virginia case turned on the "unique language" of
the compact and later arbitration clause: "of course virtually every
written agreement or award has 'unique language,' so if we could only
extend to other cases legal principles pertaining to identical language
our interpretive jurisprudence would be limited indeed."183 Scalia
found that similar to the arbitration award granting Virginia riparian
rights not subject to Maryland's authority, Article VII of the 1905 compact gave New Jersey the right, qua sovereign, to regulate riparian
84
improvements without interference from Delaware.'
Scalia disagreed with the Master's determination that when construing compacts, there exists a presumption against the defeat of a
state's title.185 Scalia stated that because the purpose of interstate
boundary compacts is to formulate a compromised boundary, there is
no need to assume that a state has retained its sovereign title; this is
precisely the right that is compromised.18 6 Scalia thus found it plausible that Delaware had given up the exclusive right to exercise jurisdiction over New Jersey's riparian improvements in order to secure its
citizens' right to fish the New Jersey side of the Delaware River at a
time when the boundary was still in dispute.' 8 7 Scalia believed that
Article VII's grant of "riparian jurisdiction of every kind and nature"
granted New Jersey authority over riparian improvements appurtenant to its shores, free from Delaware's authority to exclude such improvements under its police powers.' 8 8 Scalia thus concluded that the
word "exclusive" need not have been included in the language of Article VII.189 Finally, Scalia stated that "course of conduct" evidence was
not necessary in this case, as it is only proper to examine such evidence when a compact is ambiguous, and Scalia found no ambiguities
in the language of Article VII.190

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1430.
at 1435-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 1430-31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 1431 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 1431-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 1433 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 1434 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ANALYSIS

The similarities between the Virginia-Maryland conflict and the
New Jersey-Delaware conflict are striking. Both disputes involved interstate river boundary issues, and both disputes resulted in the ratification of compacts which addressed fishing and jurisdictional
questions, but which failed to resolve interstate riparian boundaries.
Consequently, further litigation was needed to resolve these river
boundary issues. Virginia and Maryland's boundary dispute was
eventually resolved through arbitration; New Jersey and Delaware's
dispute was resolved by a Supreme Court decision. The resulting determinations were nearly identical: Maryland was determined to own
the subaqueous soil of the Potomac to the low-water mark on the Virginia side of the river, just as Delaware was held to hold title to the
subaqueous soil of the Delaware River to the low-water mark on the
New Jersey shore within the twelve-mile circle. Both boundary determinations were still subject to the parties' earlier compacts, and this
inevitably led to subsequent litigation in the Supreme Court to interpret each state's rights, in view of the earlier compacts and boundary
resolutions. In both cases, the principal issue was whether the exercise of one state's riparian rights was subject to another state's sovereign police powers. The results were quite different; in Virginia v.
Maryland, Virginia's riparian rights trumped Maryland's sovereign
police powers, but in New Jersey III, New Jersey's riparian rights were
subject to Delaware's sovereign authority. The nagging question is
whether the two cases are reconcilable. This Part asserts that the recommendations of the Special Master in both cases are reconcilable,
but that these recommendations did not fully resolve the controversy
in New Jersey v. Delaware III. This Part further maintains that the
Court's extraordinary character test is flawed and that instead a "reasonableness" test should be used.
A.

The Recommendations of the Special Master in New
Jersey v. Delaware III are Reconcilable with Virginia
v. Maryland

The Special Master went to great lengths to justify his disparate
recommendations in the two cases. He did this chiefly by distinguishing the language of the Virginia-Maryland arbitration award from the
New Jersey-Delaware compact. 19 1 Certainly, the language in the former was distinct from the latter: Virginia's "right to such use of the
river beyond the line of low-water mark as may be necessary to the
full enjoyment of her riparian ownership" is different from New
Jersey's right to "riparian jurisdiction of every kind and nature." But
does this difference in construction justify disparate treatment of the
191. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 64-65.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88:433

two phrases? "[Flull enjoyment of her riparian ownership" does not,
on its face, appear to be all that different from "riparian jurisdiction of
every kind and nature." The two phrases certainly do not appear to
grant different amounts of riparian authority; yet the Master recommended treating them as distinct phrases which bestowed different
rights. 19 2 The Master arrived at this conclusion by finding tha't the
Virginia-Maryland award bestowed exclusive riparian authority on
Virginia, while the New Jersey-Delaware compact granted New
93
Jersey nonexclusive riparian authority.1
This was due in part to the fact that the term "riparian jurisdiction" in the New Jersey-Delaware compact was not a legal term of art
and was therefore ambiguous. 194 As an ambiguous term, the Master
found it compelling that other articles of the New Jersey-Delaware
compact included the modifier "exclusive," while Article VII's grant of
"riparian jurisdiction" had no such modifier.1 95 The Master therefore
determined that Article VII did not grant New Jersey exclusive riparian authority.' 9 6 The Master's finding is justified, considering that
"exclusive" appeared not only in other articles of the New Jersey-Delaware compact, but also in the earlier New Jersey-New York compact.' 9 7 The Court noted that portions of the latter were copied
verbatim in the former.198 It thus appears that if the drafters of the
New Jersey-Delaware compact intended to bestow "exclusive riparian
jurisdiction," they had the tools at their disposal to do so. Instead, the
phrase "riparian jurisdiction" was specially drafted for Article VII.
Why would the drafters have bothered to create such ambiguous language, when other clearer language used in the New Jersey-New York
compact was readily available? The Master's hypothesis certainly
seems plausible: the drafters intended to grant New Jersey a smaller
group of rights than was granted in the New Jersey-New York compact, and thus could not borrow the exact language from the earlier
compact (which specifically granted exclusive riparian rights).
In contrast, the Virginia-Maryland award had no such specially
drafted ambiguous language; "full enjoyment of her riparian ownership" was therefore deemed to be a plain grant of exclusive riparian
authority to Virginia. 19 9 The Master bolstered his recommendation
that New Jersey had nonexclusive riparian authority by examining
the parties' post-compact course of conduct to shed light on the meaning of "riparian jurisdiction," citing Supreme Court precedent that am192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 66-68.
New Jersey v. Delaware III, 128 S. Ct. 1410, 1413 (2008).
Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 64-65.
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biguous language may be interpreted by such evidence. 2 00 This helps
to further reconcile the disparate recommendations of the Special
Master in Virginia v. Maryland and New Jersey v. Delaware III; Maryland expressly conceded in arbitration that the interstate boundary
should be drawn around all Virginia riparian improvements, past and
future. 20 1 Delaware was found to have made no such cession, 202 and
the Master was thus able to interpret the respective grants of riparian
authority, in view of the parties' post-compact course of conduct,
differently.
The counterargument to the Master's interpretation theory was espoused by Justice Scalia, who stated that every agreement has
"unique language"; therefore, if legal principles were only applicable
to identical language in other agreements, interpretive jurisprudence
would be severely limited. 20 3 This is a valid point in general, but it is
not applicable to the New Jersey-Delaware controversy. Scalia's view
is only correct if the language of the Virginia-Maryland arbitration
award and the language of the New Jersey-Delaware compact are
both unambiguous, and therefore comparable. Scalia states that this
is s0. 2 04 However, his view is fallacious; it ignores the fact that the
phrase "riparian jurisdiction" in the New Jersey-Delaware compact
was invented especially for Article VII, and had no basis in prior
law. 2 0 5 The phrase is therefore inherently ambiguous. To attempt to
strengthen his claim, (and to avoid New Jersey's damaging post-compact cessions and acquiescences) Scalia states that the parties' postcompact course of conduct is not relevant to the Court's interpretation
of the unambiguous terms of the New Jersey-Delaware compact. 20 6
However, this argument again supposes that the phrase "riparian jurisdiction" is unambiguous, which is simply false. Article VII of the
1905 compact clearly contains inherently ambiguous language. The
Master therefore correctly applied Supreme Court precedent which
holds that evidence of the parties' post-compact course of conduct is
applicable in interpreting such language. As the Master noted, Maryland expressly conceded that the interstate boundary should be drawn
around Virginia riparian improvements; Delaware made no similar
cession. 20 7 New Jersey also acquiesced in Delaware's regulating authority, while Virginia fervently denied for over twenty years that Maryland had any regulating authority over Virginia's riparian
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 64-65.
Id. at 64-65.
New Jersey III, 128 S. Ct. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1434 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 54.
New Jersey III, 128 S. Ct. at 1434 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 64-65.
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improvements. 20 8 The parties' course of conduct thus favored a ruling
in Delaware's favor, and the Master's disparate treatment of the two
cases is warranted.
The Master's recommendations concerning other aspects of the
parties' post-compact and post-arbitration courses of action are similarly reconcilable. Virginia applied for Maryland permits for the construction of riparian improvements from 1957 to 1996.209 The Master
decided that these permit applications were not evidence of Virginia's
acquiescence to Maryland's sovereign authority to regulate riparian
improvements.210 However, in New Jersey v. Delaware III, the
Master stated that New Jersey's permit applications to Delaware,
which spanned from 1971 to 2004, did militate toward a finding in
favor of Delaware's understanding of the 1905 compact. 2 1 1 At first
glance, these findings do not appear to be congruent; Virginia applied
to Maryland for riparian permits for thirty-nine years, and was held
not to have acquiesced, while New Jersey applied for similar permits
for only thirty-three years, and was determined to have acquiesced.
When understood in context, however, the Master's determinations
appear more consistent. The Supreme Court noted that Virginia previously protested Maryland's permitting system "vigorously" in
213
1976;212 New Jersey did not protest until the recent controversy,
even though the DNREC had previously blocked a LNG wharf on the
New Jersey shore in the 1970s.214 Furthermore, as the Master noted,
New Jersey explicitly conceded exclusive riparian authority in a 1980
statement to the U.S. Department of Commerce. 2 15 The Master's distinctions between the two cases, when taken in context, thus appear to
be justified: Virginia protested Maryland's permitting of riparian improvements before such a permit was withheld; New Jersey, on the
other hand, did not protest even when previous projects were blocked
by Delaware, and then conceded that New Jersey and Delaware had
concurrent jurisdiction over riparian improvements extending beyond
the low-water mark. 2 16 The Master's disparate treatment of the two
cases again appears to be justified, and the two cases are still
reconcilable.
Other recommendations of the Special Master in New Jersey III
appear to be grounded in prior law and are generally well-reasoned.
208. Compare Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 71-72 with Virginia v.
Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 76-77 (2003).
209. Virginia, 540 U.S. at 63.
210. Id. at 76-77.
211. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 71-72.
212. Virginia, 540 U.S. at 77.
213. See Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 77-84.
214. See id. at 72.
215. See New Jersey's Response to Admissions No. 62 (DA 4177).
216. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 77-84.
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The Master's determination that the 1905 compact did not give New
Jersey the right to grant Delaware's sovereign territory is backed by
compelling precedent; as the Master noted, the Supreme Court has
held that there is a presumption against defeat of a State's title. 2 17
The fact that Article VIII of the 1905 compact reinforced this common
law presumption 2 18-coupled with the fact that Article VII did not expressly set forth New Jersey's ability to grant away Delaware territory2 19--naturally leads to the assumption that only Delaware can
grant subaqueous lands over which it is sovereign. This appears to be
a sound inference. Why would Delaware have ceded the right to grant
the very subaqueous lands over which it adamantly asserted ownership? If it would have done so, it certainly seems reasonable that it
would have ceded this right explicitly. Furthermore, the Master's determination that the 1905 compact gave New Jersey only the right to
grant riparian rights subject to Delaware's sovereign police power authority is compelling: the compact's grant of "riparian jurisdiction"
cannot be equivalent to "exclusive jurisdiction," especially when considering the parties' post-compact course of action and the comparative language of the prior New Jersey-New York compact which
explicitly granted such exclusive jurisdiction. 22 0 And as previously
discussed, the Master's findings are still reconcilable with Virginia v.
22
Maryland on this issue. 1
Justice Scalia disagreed with the recommendations of the Special
Master, stating that when interpreting boundary-related interstate
compacts, there should be no presumption against the defeat of a
state's title. 222 Scalia posited that the presumption against defeat of
state title runs against the very purpose of boundary-related interstate compacts: to resolve boundary disputes by a joint compromised
surrender of state title to the disputed lands. 2 23 Scalia speculated
that it was possible that Delaware surrendered its claimed right to
grant subaqueous land on the New Jersey shore within the twelvemile circle in order to ensure its citizens could fish past the thalweg of
2 24
the Delaware River, in waters claimed at the time by both states.
Scalia found that the language of Article VII, which granted "riparian
jurisdiction," was sufficient to bestow upon New Jersey authority over
riparian improvements free from Delaware interference. 2 25 Scalia
Id. at 42-43 (quoting United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 34 (1997)).
Id. at 42-43.
Id. at 43.
See supra notes 135, 156, 207-214, and accompanying text.
Id.
New Jersey v. Delaware III, 128 S. Ct. 1410, 1430-31 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
223. Id. at 1431 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
225. See id. at 1431-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
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crafts a facially plausible argument for his native state. 2 26 However,
he does not sufficiently explain why, if New Jersey was granted this
sort of authority, the drafters took the time to formulate the new language "riparian
jurisdiction," rather than simply inserting the word
"exclusive" 2 27 (which would have ensured the result Scalia proposes,
but with more certainty and less trouble). The Special Master's understanding is more plausible: "riparian jurisdiction" was specially
formulated to bestow a lesser amount of authority than "exclusive authority." There is no other credible explanation for why the drafters
would have expended the resources to create the unique language of
Article VII. Scalia's argument is thus not compelling.
B.

Though Reconcilable with Virginia v. Maryland, the
Special Master's Recommendations Did Not
Adequately Resolve the Controversy

For the foregoing reasons, 228 the Master's recommendations in
New Jersey III were grounded in prior law, generally well-reasoned,
and reconcilable with his recommendations in Virginia v. Maryland.
However, they did not adequately resolve the controversy. The
Master's recommendations asserted that New Jersey did not have exclusive authority to regulate riparian improvements appurtenant to
its shores extending past low-water within the twelve-mile circle; its
riparian authority was subject to Delaware's exercise of police
power. 2 29 This finding, though logical in its application of compact
interpretation, and well-reasoned according to prior precedent, did
nothing to address the underlying problem: What were the limits of
Delaware's sovereign authority? For if Delaware was allowed to exercise its police power to exclude any New Jersey riparian project extending beyond low-water, Article VII of the 1905 compact preserved
no undeniable rights for New Jersey. Certainly, Article VII was part
of the compact for a reason; it cannot be mere superfluous language.
The drafters must have intended to extend to New Jersey some kind of
riparian rights over which Delaware had no superior authority. Because the 1905 compact was drafted before the final resolution of the
states' boundary on the Delaware River, 230 it makes sense that the
226. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Blocks Planfor New Gas Plant in New Jersey, N.Y.
TIMES, April 1, 2008, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/O1
washington/Oldelaware.html?_r=3&scp=2&sq=supremecourt&st=nyt&oref=
slogin&oref=slogin&oref=slogin (online version titled Supreme Court Rules for
Delawarein River Dispute) (noting that the two dissenters in New Jersey III were
the Court's only native New Jersey Justices: Antonin Scalia and Samuel A. Alito,
Jr.).
227. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
228. See supra section III.A.
229. Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 86.
230. New Jersey III, 128 S. Ct. 1410, 1419 (2008).
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parties intended to ensure future riparian rights. Analogous to what
Justice Kennedy termed a "hedging agreement" in Virginia v. Maryland,23 1 the 1905 compact would thus have been formulated to protect
the riparian rights of both parties, lest one party gain control over the
entire river in subsequent litigation, and exclude the other party from
the river.
The Master did not resolve the problems raised by his analysis and
final determinations of the compact and later boundary resolution.232
Indeed, New Jersey and Delaware entered their third original Supreme Court action due to problems which arose from concurrent ju2 33
risdiction over the subaqueous soil within the twelve-mile circle,
and the Report of the Special Master left them in a similar position:
New Jersey still had riparian authority over riparian improvements,
subject to Delaware's police power. The Supreme Court could therefore not adopt the Report of the Special Master exactly as it was
presented, for even if the Master's recommendations were persuasive,
they gave no practical solution or test to determine the limits of Delaware's police power over New Jersey riparian improvements. If the
Court found the recommendations of the Special Master convincing, a
limit on Delaware's power to exclude New Jersey riparian projects beyond the low-water mark would need to be developed.
C.

The Court's New Test

The Court upheld the recommendations of the Special Master, but
added an "extraordinary character" test to limit Delaware's police
power. 2 34 Delaware was held to have authority to exercise its police
power only over New Jersey riparian improvements extending beyond
low-water that exhibited extraordinary character. 2 35 Delaware could
therefore only exercise its police powers to exclude New Jersey riparian improvements which extended into its territory if those improvements "exceed[ed] ordinary and usual riparian uses." 23 6 The Court
determined that the Crown Landing Project was a project of extraordinary character because it went "well beyond the ordinary or
usual[,"237 and thus, Delaware was justified in excluding the project
from within the twelve-mile circle. 238 The application of the ex231. Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 85 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
232. See Report of the Special Master, supra note 9, at 84-86. "This case does not
require a determination of the precise extent of Delaware's regulatory jurisdiction, but only whether Delaware may exercise any jurisdiction over wharves and
other improvements extending outshore of the boundary." Id. at 85.
233. New Jersey III, 128 S. Ct. at 1416-19.
234. Id. at 1416.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1428 (decree of the Court).
237. Id. at 1427 (majority opinion).
238. Id. at 1428 (decree of the Court).
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traordinary character test allowed the Court to adopt the recommendations of the Special Master and determine a limit to Delaware's
regulating authority.
The extraordinary character test is a new approach for determining the limits of a state's police power over its sovereign territory that
has been subjected to another state's exercise of compact-granted riparian rights. The test is unprecedented; a search of previous Supreme
Court decisions which involved riparian rights and boundary disputes
failed to reveal any prior application or discussion of such test. 23 9 A
similar search in the treatises also failed to reveal a prior application
of the test. 240 Justice Scalia thus appears to have been correct when
he stated: "So unheard-of is the [extraordinary character test] that its
first appearance in this case is in the Court's opinion."241 Scalia found
that the test had "no basis in prior law," and that the test was "difficult to accept, because the Court explains neither the meaning nor the
provenance of its .. .test."24 2 Scalia's statement is supported by the
fact that the Court failed to discuss the test in Maryland v. Virginia in
2003.243 The same general compact rights that were at issue in New
Jersey III were also at issue in Virginia v. Maryland, so the Court
surely would have cited such a test had it existed, for it may have been
dispositive in the 2003 case, as discussed below. 244 The Court failed
to apply the test in Virginia v. Maryland simply because the test did
not exist until the Court's opinion in New Jersey III was announced.
1.

The ExtraordinaryCharacterTest Limits Virginia v.
Maryland

In Virginia v.Maryland, the Court held that Maryland, as owner
of the riverbed abutting Virginia, could not exercise its police power to
exclude Virginian riparian improvements from its lands. 245 The
Court's decision appeared to rebuff the notion that a state could assert
its police power to exclude the riparian improvements of another state
that had compact-preserved riparian rights. The Virginia v. Mary239. See Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56 (2003); New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S.
767 (1998); Georgia v. South Carolina, 497 U.S. 376 (1990); New Jersey v. Delaware II, 291 U.S. 361 (1934); Vermont v. New Hampshire, 289 U.S. 593 (1933);
Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65 (1926).
240. See 1 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM,THE LAw OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 60-64
JOHN M. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF WATERS, INCLUDING RIPARIAN
RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN WATERS TIDAL AND INLAND § 181 (2d
ed. 1891); A. DAN TARLOCI, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 3 (Marie-Joy

(1904);

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Paredes & Lisa A. Fiening eds., release No. 20, 2008).
New Jersey III, 128 S. Ct. at 1430 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56 (2003).
See infra subsection III.C.1.
Virginia, 540 U.S. at 79 (decree of the Court).
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land decision thus would have led to the assumption that New
Jersey-as a state that had been granted compact-preserved riparian
rights-would be able to wharf out into Delaware territory, free from
Delaware's authority to exclude such riparian improvements. However, the Court came to a different conclusion: Delaware had the sovereign authority to exclude New Jersey riparian improvements which
exhibited extraordinary character. 246 The New Jersey III holding
thus effectively limited the Virginia v. Maryland decision to its facts;
that Virginia v. Maryland decision turned on the "unique language" of
the compact and arbitration award therein. 2 47 The language of the
New Jersey-Delaware compact was thus found to be distinct from the
Virginia-Maryland compact and arbitration award, so the Court determined that different results in the respective cases were warranted. 248 The apparent holding in Virginia v. Maryland-that a
state could not exercise its sovereign authority to infringe upon another state's compact-preserved riparian rights-was thus reduced to
a mere language-specific holding of little consequence.
Though the New Jersey III decision limited Virginia v. Maryland to
its facts, the Court's disparate holdings may still be reconciled. As
previously discussed, the contrasting treatment of the language of the
New Jersey-Delaware compact from the language of the Virginia-Maryland compact and arbitration award is defensible because the
phrase "riparian jurisdiction" was different from the clearer language
at issue in Virginia v. Maryland. Furthermore, the new "extraordinary character" test itself may be reconcilable with the Virginia v. Maryland outcome. That is, an application of the new test to the facts of
Virginia v. Maryland may have resulted in a Virginia victory. If the
Virginian water intake pipe could be characterized as an "ordinary or
usual" riparian improvement, then said pipe would not possess "extraordinary character," and Maryland, as sovereign of the riverbed,
would therefore not be able to exclude it under an exercise of its police
power. The question remains: What is an ordinary or usual riparian
improvement?
2. Problems With the "ExtraordinaryCharacter"Test
As previously noted, the Court did not specify what constituted an
"ordinary or usual" riparian use. 24 9 The omission of explicit boundaries for the definition of "ordinary or usual" riparian use gives the
Court great latitude in determining whether a riparian improvement
exhibits extraordinary character and thus may be excluded by a sovereign's exercise of police power. Justice Scalia found that this discre246.
247.
248.
249.

New Jersey III, 128 S.Ct. at 1416.
Id. at 1424.
Id. at 1424-25.
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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tion was unwarranted, and had no basis in prior law. 250 Scalia noted
that at common law, only riparian uses which interfered with the public's right of navigation on a navigable body of water were beyond ordinary and usual use. 25 1 Because the Crown Landing Project would not
have interfered with navigation on the Delaware River, Scalia would
hold that the project was an ordinary and usual use of the river as
understood at common law. 25 2 Scalia's concerns are valid; not only is
the new test unprecedented, but it also gives the Court broad discretion to determine extraordinary or unusual uses on an ad hoc basis.
Scalia apparently noticed the ad hoc nature of the new test when he
chided the Court for its "environmentally sensitive" decision, stating
that if the wharf were used to transfer "tofu and bean sprouts" rather
than LNG, the Court would have found for New Jersey. 25 3 Scalia also
noted, "[The Supreme Court] can anticipate a whole category of original actions in this Court that will clarify, wharf by wharf, what is a
wharf of 'extraordinary character.'"254 It certainly appears as though
the new test may spawn needless litigation. Without an explicit definition of what constitutes an ordinary or usual riparian improvement,
how will New Jersey and Delaware resolve future disputes over proposed wharfs without litigation? And the waste of judicial resources
will be at the level at which those resources are most scarce: the U.S.
Supreme Court.255
Another problem with the new test is that it apparently prevents
Delaware from exercising its police authority to regulate ordinary or
usual New Jersey riparian improvements. Delaware has been regulating New Jersey improvements which extend into the Delaware
River since the early 1970s. 2 5 6 The Special Master specifically cited
this course of conduct in interpreting the language of the New JerseyDelaware compact, and found that it led to the assumption that New
Jersey acquiesced in Delaware's regulating authority. 25 7 The Master
also found it probative that New Jersey made a statement against its
own interest in declaring to the U.S. Department of Commerce that
riparian projects which extend beyond the mean low-water mark need
permits from both states. 2 58 The Court cited these findings as conclu250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

New Jersey III, 128 S. Ct. at 1430 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1432.
Id. at 1440.
Id. at 1439.
Id. at 1440.
Though states may resolve interpretation disputes between themselves without
litigation, when negotiations fail, litigation over interstate boundaries and compacts is only proper as an original action in the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1974).
256. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 7001-7013 (2001).
257. The Report of the Special Master, supra note 9 at 71-72.
258. Id. at 72-73.
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sive of the fact that the parties' prior course of conduct militated toward a ruling in Delaware's favor.2 59 However, the Court then
announced the extraordinary character test, which would apparently
prevent Delaware from regulating New Jersey riparian improvements
which exhibit ordinary or usual character. The Court thus cited New
Jersey's acquiescence in Delaware's regulating authority as reason to
interpret the compact as bestowing upon Delaware the right to regulate riparian improvements, but then announced a test which prevents Delaware from further exercise of such permitting authority.
D.

A "Reasonable" Alternative

The most logical way for the Court to limit Delaware's police power
over New Jersey riparian improvements was to simply apply a "reasonableness" requirement to Delaware's exercise of regulatory authority, as Justice Stevens suggested in his concurring opinion. 26 0 This
would have allowed the Court to uphold the recommendations of the
Special Master, while still preserving Article VII's grant of "riparian
jurisdiction" to New Jersey. Under the reasonableness requirement,
Delaware could not arbitrarily exercise its police powers to prevent
New Jersey riparian improvements which extended beyond the lowwater mark, nor could it regulate New Jersey riparian improvements
differently than Delaware riparian improvements without good reason; Delaware's regulation of improvements along both shores would
need to be congruent.
The reasonableness requirement is additionally appealing because
it is backed by a great deal of precedent. Although apparently never
applied to interstate compact disputes over riparian rights such as the
ones at issue in New Jersey III, there exist many established tests for
what constitutes reasonable police power. 26 1 This is in contrast to the
Court's novel "extraordinary character" test, which has no apparent
prior basis in law. 2 62 Furthermore, the reasonableness requirement
would have orchestrated the same result that the Court's "extraordinary character" test ultimately achieved. That is, Delaware could
properly prohibit the Crown Landing Project from extending into its
sovereign territory under the reasonableness requirement, because
the prohibition of "bulk transfer" and "heavy industry" facilities on
Delaware subaqueous lands would apply equally to both the New
Jersey and Delaware shores of the river. Delaware could reasonably
exclude such improvements on its own shores, so it could therefore
also exclude such projects on the New Jersey shore, as sovereign over
the subaqueous land.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 90.
New Jersey v. Delaware III, 128 S.Ct. at 1429 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
See 16A Am.JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 331 (2008).
See New Jersey III, 128 S.Ct. at 1430 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The reasonableness requirement would also have allowed Delaware to continue to regulate all riparian improvements appurtenant
to the New Jersey shore extending past low-water, rather than just
those which exhibit extraordinary character. The "reasonableness"
test would therefore have been more consistent with the Court's determination that New Jersey acquiesced in Delaware's regulating authority. That is, if the Court applied the "reasonableness test" rather
than the "extraordinary character" test, there would not be the
marked incongruity in the Court's decision (which cited New Jersey's
acquiesce as proof of Delaware's authority to regulate, but then ultimately enjoined Delaware from regulating improvements to the full
extent of that authority).
However, the Court could not seriously consider the simple implementation of a "reasonableness" test without overruling Virginia v.
Maryland. In Virginia v. Maryland, the Court decided that the compact and arbitration award therein gave Virginia the right to the use
of the Potomac, free from any Maryland exercises of police power as
the sovereign over the subaqueous soil.263 Maryland was thus held to
have no regulating authority over its own lands. 26 4 The Court rejected the theory that the arbitration language which granted Virginia
the "right to such use of the river beyond the line of low-water mark as
may be necessary to the full enjoyment of her riparian ownership" left
Maryland any residual police power to exert over Virginia's riparian
rights, reasonable or otherwise. 26 5 Justice Kennedy's dissent adamantly disagreed with this holding; he would have held that Maryland retained its authority to exercise reasonable police power over
Virginian riparian improvements. 266 The Court thus implicitly rejected implementing a "reasonableness" test when it announced its
holding in Virginia v. Maryland, and the New Jersey III Court could
not resurrect Justice Kennedy's dissent without overruling the earlier
decision. While the "reasonableness" test was the superior test to implement in New Jersey III, the "extraordinary character" test allowed
the Court to restrict Virginia v. Maryland to its facts without overruling it. It appears that the Court preferred to implement an entirely
unprecedented test that allowed a final determination in New Jersey
III which was reconcilable with Virginia v. Maryland, rather than implement a test that the Court previously rejected.

263.
264.
265.
266.

Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 80 (2003).
Id.
Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Though well-reasoned and grounded in prior law, the findings of
the Special Master in New Jersey III did not adequately resolve the
controversy between the states because no test was proposed with
which to determine the limits of Delaware's police power to exclude
New Jersey's riparian improvements. Instead, the Supreme Court
presented what it referred to as an "extraordinary character" test,
which was reconcilable with the Court's holding in Virginia v. Maryland and which also provided limits to Delaware's exercise of police
power. However, this "extraordinary character" test was not rooted in
any identifiable precedent. A superior test for the Court to have
adopted would have been one of reasonableness; although such a test
could not be reconciled with Virginia v. Maryland, it would have a
solid basis in precedent and would guide the Court in making future
consistent interpretations of interstate compact language.

